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David	Albert	presents	us	here	with	a	(delightful)	collection	of	essays	(eight	of	them)	
exploring	quantum	physics	and	statistical	physics	and	metaphysics	and	the	conceptual	
connections	between	them.		The	essays	are	not	organized	around	a	unified	theme.		But	they	
are	connected	by	Albert's	distinctive	philosophical	agenda,	which	I	would	characterize	
thus:	interpreters	of	physics	must	prize	intelligibility	and	conceptual	clarity	above	all.		And	
if	this	leads	us	to	a	picture	of	reality	which	is	remarkably	surprising,	which	is	not	at	all	what	
we	would	(prior	to	interpreting	physics)	have	expected,	well	then	so	be	it.		Reality	is	
strange.			Period.		Case	closed.		End	of	story.	
This	collection	will	be	a	treat	for	Albert	fans.		Albert’s	trademark	writing	style	
is	lively,	and	conversational,	and	fun,	and	(as	befits	his	subject)	evocative	of	a	certain	sense	
of	wonder,	and	if	not	inimitable	(exactly),	then	at	least	unique	to	him.		And	it	is	very	much	on	
display	in	After	Physics.		Despite	its	structure	as	an	essay	collection,	the	book	is	
comprehensive,	including	commentary	on	nearly	all	the	major	topics	of	Albert’s	previous	
work.		Taken	together,	these	essays	represent	another	step	forward	in	that	body	of	work;	
indeed,	some	of	them	are	already	landmark	papers.	
The	opening	essay,	“Physics	and	Chance,”	defends	two	bold	theses:	first,	that	chance	
(objective	physical	probability)	is	indispensable	even	in	deterministic	physical	theories;	
second,	that	everything	about	our	world	is	reducible	to	fundamental	physics.		In	a	
deterministic	theory,	chance	must	take	the	form	of	an	objective	probability	distribution	
over	possible	histories	of	the	universe;	as	in	his	(2003)	Time	and	Chance,	Albert	argues	that	
such	a	distribution	is	necessary	to	explain	the	success	of	statistical	mechanics.	
In	Albert’s	view,	this	picture	demands	a	Humean	understanding	of	physical	modal	
facts	about	law	and	chance,	on	which	these	“modal”	facts	summarize	the	fundamental	
physical	facts	rather	than	governing	them.		After	all,	the	chance	of	some	deterministic	
history	obtaining	cannot	fit	into	an	anti‐Humean	picture	of	chance	as	the	propensity	of	
initial	states	to	produce	different	later	states.	
Here	I	think	Albert	goes	too	far,	ignoring	another	possibility.		It	could	be	that	the	
chance	distribution	over	histories	is	best	understood	as	a	Humean,	non‐governing	modal	
fact,	but	that	the	deterministic	laws	of	classical	physics	are	full‐blooded,	non‐Humean	
governing	laws.		Humean	laws	are,	after	all,	just	a	sort	of	summary	of	the	facts.		There	is	no	
reason	they	could	not	coexist	with	other,	more	robust	governing	laws.		Indeed,	a	picture	
like	this	could	explain	why	it’s	tempting	to	think	that	the	probability	distribution	over	
histories	isn’t	physically	necessary	in	the	same	sense	as	the	deterministic	laws.	
Albert’s	defense	of	reductionism,	on	the	other	hand,	is	masterful.		He	points	out	that	
many	explanations	internal	to	physics	share	the	features	of	special‐science	explanations	
(such	as	multiple	realizability)	which	seem	to	suggest	that	the	special	sciences	cannot	be	
reduced	to	physics.		Since	physical	explanations	are	obviously	reducible	to	physics,	it	must	
be	that	multiple	realizability	is	not	incompatible	with	reduction	after	all.		Non‐specialists	as	
well	as	philosophers	of	science	will	find	this	first	chapter	both	readable	and	edifying.	
	 “The	Difference	between	the	Past	and	the	Future”	is	written	in	the	form	of	a	
dialogue	between	“Huckleberry”	(a	stand‐in	for	Albert)	and	“Jedediah,”	a	critic	who	shares	
some	views	in	common	with	Tim	Maudlin.		Jedediah	raises	a	variety	of	objections	to	
Huckleberry’s	position	that	our	perception	of	time’s	arrow	is	explained	by	the	postulate	
(called	the	past	hypothesis)	that	one	of	time’s	endpoints	(the	one	we	call	“the	past”)	is	much	
lower	in	entropy	than	the	other	endpoint.	
	 Huckleberry	does	a	fine	job	responding	to	a	variety	of	pressing	objections.		The	
resulting	view	is	highly	counterintuitive:	our	inability	to	influence	the	past	turns	out	to	be	
only	an	approximate,	for‐all‐practical‐purposes	inability	rather	than	a	true	impossibility.		
Opponents	who	cannot	accept	this	may	see	the	essay	as	an	exercise	in	bullet‐biting,	but	
more	flexible	readers	will	find	that	it	all	hangs	together	well,	despite	a	fair	bit	of	
sketchiness	in	the	account’s	details.	
	 “The	Past	Hypothesis	and	Knowledge	of	the	External	World”	begins	with	an	
argument	that	we	can	only	learn	from	experience	and	experiment	if	we	assume	that	our	
measuring	devices	(our	senses	included)	began	in	a	“ready	state,”	and	that	this	assumption	
amounts	to	affirming	the	past	hypothesis.		We	are	then	treated	to	a	criticism	of	the	claims	
of	physicists	investigating	Bohm’s	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics,	who	have	tried	to	
prove	that	Bohmian	mechanics	entails	the	same	limitations	on	an	observer’s	knowledge	as	
ordinary	quantum	mechanics.		This	is	not	my	favorite	essay	in	the	volume;	it	jumps	around	
quite	a	bit	and	will	be	mostly	of	in‐house	interest	to	Bohmians.	
	 “The	Technique	of	Significables,”	on	the	other	hand,	provides	a	shining	example	of	
the	straightforward,	common‐sense	insight	that	characterizes	Albert’s	best	work.		Tackling	
the	problem	of	which	quantities	in	quantum	theory	should	count	as	detectable,	Albert	
points	out	that	we	can	answer	this	question	by	simply	picking	a	device	for	record‐keeping	
which	we	know	to	be	under	our	control	(his	example	is	the	position	of	golf	balls)	and	
determining	whether	the	quantities	in	question	can	be	made	to	influence	that	record‐
keeping	device.		It’s	the	sort	of	insight	that	makes	you	wonder	why	you	haven’t	been	seeing	
the	problem	Albert’s	way	all	along.		He	then	applies	this	technique	to	establish	the	
impossibility	of	faster‐than‐light	signaling	in	collapse	and	hidden‐variable	interpretations	
of	quantum	mechanics.		This	essay	is	short	and	sweet‐‐a	real	gem.	
	 In	its	previous	life	as	an	unpublished	manuscript,	“Physics	and	Narrative”	has	
already	attained	the	status	of	a	classic.		Albert	presents	a	quantum	mechanical	example	in	
which	the	state	at	every	instant	of	time	in	one	(special	relativistic)	frame	of	reference	does	
not	uniquely	determine	the	sequence	of	instantaneous	states	with	respect	to	a	different	
frame.			To	find	the	relationship	between	the	sequence	of	states	in	one	frame	and	the	
sequence	of	states	in	the	other,	one	also	needs	to	know	the	dynamical	laws	of	time‐
evolution	that	govern	the	system	(i.e.,	the	system’s	Hamiltonian).		Albert	names	this	
phenomenon	the	failure	of	narratability.	
Albert	tentatively	suggests	that	we	respond	to	this	example	by	giving	up	the	
Einsteinian	picture	of	relativity	in	favor	of	the	Lorentzian	view	that	an	undetectable	
preferred	frame	exists.		Less	radical	alternatives	are	possible,	though‐‐for	example,	one	
might	deny	the	existence	of	truly	instantaneous	states.		Moreover,	Judes	(2010)	has	shown	
that	Albert’s	example	violates	the	cluster	decomposition	principle,	which	is	a	common	
feature	of	our	most	fundamental	existing	quantum	theories.		Unless	a	more	realistic	
example	of	narratability	failure	can	be	found,	we	may	not	need	to	adapt	our	understanding	
of	quantum	theory	to	accommodate	it.	
	 “Quantum	Mechanics	and	Everyday	Life”	briefly	argues	for	and	then	expounds	on	
one	of	Albert’s	most	well‐known	and	widely‐discussed	positions:	wavefunction	realism.		On	
this	view,	the	quantum	world	fundamentally	consists	of	a	complex‐valued	field	that	exists	
in	an	extremely	high‐dimensional	space.		Albert’s	description	of	how	an	ontology	like	this	
might	recover	the	familiar	manifest	appearance	of	three‐dimensional	reality	is	of	great	
foundational	interest.		Making	sense	of	how	we	might	be	mistaken	about	the	number	of	
spatial	dimensions	in	our	world	is	an	extremely	difficult	problem	which	also	arises	in	other	
fields	of	physics,	like	string	theory.		Albert	makes	significant	progress	on	this	problem.	
	 Wavefunction	realism	itself	is	of	less	intrinsic	interest	than	Albert	suggests	here,	
however.		The	view	is	extremely	implausible	for	a	variety	of	reasons.		As	Albert	notes,	it	
requires	throwing	out	the	usual	picture	of	relativistic	spacetime.		It	also	requires	ascribing	
fundamental	reality	to	the	undetectable	global	phase	of	the	quantum	state,	one	of	the	
clearest	examples	of	surplus	mathematical	structure	in	all	of	physics.		Albert	makes	things	
look	easy	for	wavefuction	realism	by	presenting	only	a	single	alternative	which	shares	
these	disadvantages	(the	dualistic	view	that	the	wavefunction	in	high‐dimensional	space	
exists	in	parallel	with	familiar	three‐dimensional	reality).		But	there	are	many	alternative	
ontologies	which	avoid	some	or	all	of	these	disadvantages	(Belot	2012,	Miller	2014,	
Wallace	and	Timpson	2010).		Since	Albert	ignores	these	alternatives,	this	essay	succeeds	as	
an	exploration	of	wavefunction	realism	but	not	as	a	defense	of	it.	
	 “Primitive	Ontology”	criticizes	a	family	of	interpretations	of	quantum	mechanics,	
including	Bohmian	mechanics	and	the	so‐called	flash	and	mass‐density	versions	of	GRW	
collapse	theory,	which	posit	three‐dimensional	configurations	of	matter	in	addition	to	the	
quantum	state.		These	theories	are	often	prized	for	their	easy	conceptual	intelligibility.		We	
think	of	matter	as	the	sort	of	thing	which	fills	three‐dimensional	space‐‐the	sort	of	thing	we	
can	picture	geometrically.		On	primitive	ontology	theories,	this	folk	conception	turns	out	to	
be	true.	
	 But	as	Albert	points	out,	there	is	another	folk	commitment	that	primitive	ontology	
theories	abandon.		We	ordinarily	think	that	matter	affects	other	matter	through	
interactions	like	collisions,	gravitational	attraction,	etc.		On	primitive	ontology	theories,	
though,	these	apparent	interactions	are	really	the	result	of	the	quantum	state	pushing	the	
matter	around.		The	matter,	on	the	other	hand,	does	not	affect	the	quantum	state,	so	it	isn’t	
as	if	we	can	understand	this	as	the	state	mediating	cause‐and‐effect	interactions	between	
the	matter.		The	matter	is	just	a	pile	of	inert	stuff	that	is	acted	upon	but	doesn’t	act	upon	
anything	else.		Albert’s	point	is	that	while	primitive	ontology	theories	save	our	pre‐
theoretic	conception	of	matter	filling	up	three‐dimensional	space,	they	accomplish	this	by	
throwing	away	our	pre‐theoretic	conception	of	matter	as	stuff	that	interacts.	
	 It’s	not	entirely	clear	what	epistemological	assumptions	are	being	made	here,	but	
what	seems	to	be	happening	is	that	both	primitive	ontology	theorists	and	Albert	are	trying	
to	satisfy	an	imperative	for	methodological	conservatism.		The	question,	then,	is	which	part	
of	our	manifest	conception	of	the	world	is	more	indispensable:	the	notion	that	matter	fills	
up	three‐dimensional	space,	or	the	notion	that	matter	interacts.		Both	seem	pretty	crucial!		
It’s	enough	to	make	one	hope	that	some	alternative	interpretation‐‐the	many‐worlds	
interpretation,	for	example‐‐might	let	us	have	it	all.	
	 No	such	luck,	Albert	argues.		The	final	chapter,	“Probability	in	the	Everett	Picture,”	
attacks	the	trendy	decision‐theoretic	account	of	probability	in	the	many‐worlds	
interpretation.		Prima	facie,	it	is	a	great	puzzle	why	we	should	observe	the	ordinary	
probabilities	predicted	by	quantum	mechanics	on	the	many‐worlds	view,	which	entails	that	
every	possible	outcome	of	every	experiment	actually	occurs	in	some	branch	of	the	
universal	wavefunction.		(No,	there	aren’t	more	branches	for	the	more	probable	outcomes.)		
The	going	answer	to	this	puzzle	is	that	when	a	supposedly	well‐motivated	principle	called	
equivalence	is	adopted,	together	with	some	axioms	of	decision	theory,	it	would	be	irrational	
to	bet	on	the	outcome	of	an	experiment	except	in	a	way	that	accords	with	the	ordinary	
quantum	probabilities.	
	 Betting,	as	Albert	observes,	is	hardly	the	whole	of	probability’s	role	in	our	lives,	and	
as	he	rightly	points	out	there	are	a	variety	of	problems	for	the	many‐worlds	view	stemming	
from	this	fact.		He	follows	this	up	with	an	entertaining	and	pointed	attack	on	the	
equivalence	principle	assumed	by	the	many‐worlds	view.		’Tis	not	contrary	to	reason,	
Albert	points	out,	to	weight	the	probabilities	of	branches	by	some	physical	quantity	within	
those	branches	(the	example	he	gives	is	the	observer’s	mass).		But	to	do	so	would	violate	
equivalence;	consequently,	equivalence	is	not	an	acceptable	principle	of	rationality.		This	
chapter	poses	a	difficult	challenge	that	every	many‐worlds	theorist	must	grapple	with.	
	 This	is	a	fine	collection,	although	not	without	its	flaws.		Earlier	I	praised	Albert’s	
unique	style.		But	not	every	stylistic	quirk	of	After	Physics	is	praiseworthy;	one	in	particular	
would	have	been	easy	to	improve	upon.		In	many	of	the	essays,	citations	are	sparse	and	
unsystematic.		Sometimes	full	bibliographic	data	is	given	in	a	footnote,	but	at	other	times	
only	an	author’s	name	and	title	appear	in	the	main	text.		The	work	of	Gibbs	and	Boltzmann	
in	statistical	mechanics,	and	Goldstein	and	Maudlin’s	arguments	against	primitive	
observability,		are	discussed	without	mentioning	even	a	title.		Direct	quotations	from	the	
references	are	sometimes	provided	without	page	numbers.		Readers	hoping	to	follow	up	on	
Albert’s	discussion	of	other	works	will	have	to	consult	Google	rather	more	extensively	than	
they	might	like.	
	 While	I	would’ve	appreciated	another	round	of	editing	to	correct	these	omissions,	it	
is	a	testament	to	Albert‐‐to	the	wit,	sharp	intellect	and	sense	of	fun	that	he	brings	to	his	
project‐‐that	I	accepted	them	happily	in	exchange	for	the	rewards	offered	by	After	Physics.		
In	an	age	of	pioneering	new	philosophy	that	now	addresses	cutting‐edge	topics	like	string	
theory,	gauge	theories	and	quantum	field	theory,	it’s	important	to	get	back	to	basics	once	in	
a	while‐‐to	remind	oneself	that	even	well‐worn	physical	theories	like	statistical	physics	and	
quantum	mechanics	remain	deeply	mysterious.		No	one	is	better	at	exploring	these	most	
basic	mysteries	of	physics	than	Albert.		Period.	
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